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Note
The California Backlash Against
Bilingual Education: Valeria G. v.
Wilson and Proposition 227
By CATHERINE P. JOHNSON*
ON JUNE 2, 1998, California voters resoundingly passed Proposition
227, requiring all students in California's public schools to be
taught academic subjects in English.1 Effectively dismantling the bilin-
gual education system that had been in effect for the previous twenty
years,2 the new law mandates that instructors at public schools teach
all subjects to non-English speaking children in "sheltered English im-
mersion" programs.3 The day after California voters passed Proposi-
tion 227, public interest attorneys filed a class action suit against
Governor Pete Wilson, the State Board of Education and its members,
and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction Delaine Eastin,4
on behalf of 1.4 million students classified as "Limited English Profi-
cient"5 ("LEP"), alleging that the new law violated their rights under
the Civil Rights Act of 19646 and the Equal Educational Opportunities
Act7 ("EEOA").
Although opponents of Proposition 227 have described critics of
bilingual education as "intellectual xenophobes" and "cultural
hegemonists,"8 Proposition 227 originally grew out of a 1996 boycott
by parents of Latino children who were being taught in their native
* Class of 2000.
1. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 300-40 (West Supp. 1999).
2. See Editorial, Status Quo is No Go What We're Doing for Immigrant Students Isn't Work-
ing, But Why?, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Apr. 19, 1998, at 4C.
3. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (West Supp. 1999).
4. See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
5. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 306(a) (West Supp. 1999).
6. See Paul Elias, Prop 227 Suit Has a Familiar Ring, THE RECORDER, June 4, 1998, at 3.
7. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-58 (1976).
8. George M. Kraw, Language Barrier, THE RECORDER, Apr. 24, 1998, at 5.
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Spanish language at Los Angeles' Ninth Street Elementary School. 9
Dismayed by their children's illiteracy in English and frustrated with a
school administration that insisted on teaching their children in Span-
ish, the parents removed their children from the school. 10
Ironically, educators had implemented special language pro-
grams precisely to avoid the type of frustrations the Latino parents
were experiencing. 1 However, until the passing of Proposition 227
and the federal district court's decision validating the initiative in Vale-
ria G. v. Wilson, non-English speaking California school children were
being held back by a well-intentioned but ineffective bilingual educa-
tional system mired in politics and bureaucracy. 12
Part I of this Note discusses the development of federal and Cali-
fornia bilingual education law, which culminated in a California back-
lash against bilingual education with the passage of Proposition 227.
Part II examines Valeria G. v. Wilson. Supporting the court's decision
in Valerie G., Part III discusses the issues of the legislative power of the
referendum in California, and inaccuracies in the identification of stu-
dents as Limited English Proficient. Additionally, Part III discusses
how Proposition 227 neither prevents state and local agencies from
fulfilling their educational duties nor violates Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.
I. Background
A. English Immersion and Bilingual Education Programs
Structured English immersion programs, including the one man-
dated by Proposition 227, seek to teach English to LEP students in a
9. See id.
10. See id. A garment shop worker who was one of the boycott leaders told a reporter,
"I want my daughter to learn English. All the exams for things like lawyers and doctors are
in English. Without English, she would have to take a job like mine." George M. Kraw,
Educational Babel, THE RECORDER, July 24, 1998 at 5 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
a garment shop worker).
11. See Rachel F. Moran, Of Democracy, Devaluation, and Bilingual Education, 26 CREIGH-
TON L. REv. 255, 260-64 (1993) (analyzing the federal government's strategies for interven-
tion on behalf of linguistic minority students under two models of democratic
decisionmaking-"special-interest bargaining" and "'technocratic' republicanism"-and
exploring whether the two models "can be supplemented by an ethic of pluralism"); see also
Christine Rossell & Keith Baker, Selecting and Exiting Students in Bilingual Educational Pro-
grams, 17J.L. & EDuc. 589, 590-91 (1988) ("examin[ing] the problem of determining who
is to receive bilingual education").
12. See Moran, supra note 11, at 260-64.
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short, intensive period.1 3 Although subject-matter instruction is taught
almost entirely in English, students are not presumed to be fluent in
English. 14 In structured English immersion programs, teachers are bi-
lingual in both English and the students' native language.' 5 While the
students may ask questions in their native language, the teachers will
generally answer the students in English. 16 The goal of these pro-
grams is to "mainstream" LEP students into the English-speaking class-
room as soon as their English skills are deemed proficient.' 7
In contrast, bilingual educational instructions are based on the
theory that LEP students will learn English best by learning to read in
both their native language and English.' Students receive subject
matter instruction in their native language while also receiving special
English instruction.1 9 Like the structured English immersion pro-
grams, the goal of bilingual education is to help LEP students achieve
proficiency in English so they may exit the program to join their Eng-
lish-proficient peers in regular classes.20
B. Federal Law
1. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968
The first federal bilingual education law, 2' the Bilingual Educa-
tion Act 22 ("Act"), was originally intended as a Congressional response
to pressures from parents and community leaders who were distressed
by their schoolchildren's low achievement test scores and high drop-
out rates. 23 Convinced that bilingual education was the answer to
these problems, proponents urged Congress to pass the Act, which
would mandate bilingual education for LEP students. 24 The Act
13. SeeJeremy D. Marcus, Educating Immigrant Children: To What End?, 10 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 485, 492 (1996).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See Moran, supra note 11, at 256 n.7.
17. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 492.
18. See Moran, supra note 11, at 256 n.4.
19. See id; see also Marcus, supra note 13, at 493-94.
20. See Marcus, supra note 13, at 493.
21. See Gi Hyan An, The Right to Bilingual Education: Providing Equal Educational Oppor-
tunity for Limited English Proficient Children in a Pluralist, Multicultural Society, 11 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 133, 142 (1996).
22. Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783, 816-19 (1968) (omitted
in the general revision of Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, by Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 130-431).
23. See Moran, supra note 11, at 260.
24. See id. at 260-61.
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amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 196525 and
provided "financial assistance to local educational agencies to develop
and carry out new and imaginative elementary and secondary school
programs designed to meet [the] special educational needs [of LEP
students] ,"26 However, the Act did not require public schools to pro-
vide bilingual education programs to LEP students.2 7 Instead, the Act
in many respects manifested Congress's belief that additional research
was needed to determine how best to teach LEP children. 2 Accord-
ingly, Congress hired numerous education experts to define the struc-
ture of LEP programs and monitor their effectiveness under the Act.29
The experts measured a program's effectiveness based on the stu-
dents' performance on English and mathematics achievement tests.30
Notably, Congress's intent was to provide instruction to LEP students
that would result in English proficiency. 31 The Act's purpose was not
to help LEP students achieve literacy in their native language or to
promote their respective cultures, as many proponents of bilingual ed-
ucation tend to argue.32
2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196433 ("Title VI") provides:
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in ... any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 34 Title VI was originally
25. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(1965).
26. Bilingual Education Act, § 702, 81 Stat. at 816.
27. See Moran, supra note 11, at 262 n.26.
28. See id. at 263. "The Act provided 'financial assistance to local educational agencies
to develop and carry out new and imaginative elementary and secondary school programs
designed to meet special educational needs [of NEP and LEP students].'" Id. at 262 n.25
(quoting the Bilingual Education Act) (alteration in original). NEP is defined as non-Eng-
lish-proficient. See id. at 256.
29. See Moran, supra note 11, at 262.
30. See id.
31. See generally Bilingual Education Act, 81 Stat. 783, 816-19 (1968). The Act defined
the target group as children educationally disadvantaged because of their limited ability to
speak English. See id. Further, the 1978 amendment to the Bilingual Education Act pro-
vided that it was "the policy of the United States . . . to demonstrate effective ways of
providing, for children of limited English proficiency, instruction designed to enable
them, while using their native language, to achieve competence in the English language."
Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2268 (1978).
32. See The Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 90-247, § 701, 81 Stat. 783 (1968).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
34. Id.
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enacted to "eliminat[e] racial segregation in the South." 35 Thus, the
objective of the Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), the administrative
agency responsible for the enforcement of Tide VI, was to penalize
school districts that failed to comply with Title VI.36 In 1970, the OCR
officially recognized the application of Title VI to LEP students in
guidelines which stated:
"[W] here inability to speak and understand the English language
excludes national origin-minority group children from effective
participation in the educational program offered by a school dis-
trict, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language
deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these
students."
3 7
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court's decision in the semi-
nal case of Lau v. NichoW8 provided the OCR with the support it
needed to promote the guidelines. Strongly influenced by the OCR's
guidelines,39 the Lau Court held the San Francisco Unified School
District violated Title VI by failing to provide non-English-speaking
Chinese-American students with "a meaningful opportunity to partici-
pate in the [school's] educational program . . . ."40 The Supreme
Court ordered the San Francisco Unified School District to rectify
English-language deficiency among non-English speaking students to
enable them to participate effectively in academic programs. 41 Thus,
by not offering the Chinese students special English instruction, the
Lau court found the school denied them "equality of treatment,"
thereby violating Title VI.4 2
After the Lau decision, the OCR implemented what came to be
known as the "Lau Guidelines."43 Created by bilingual educators, law-
35. Moran, supra note 11, at 265.
36. See id. at 264-65 (citing the OCR's guidelines, Office for Civil Rights, Identifica-
tion of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg.
11,595 (1970)). It should be noted that the OCR issues guidelines that are non-binding
orders. See id.
37. Id. at 265 (quoting Office for Civil Rights, Identification of Discrimination and
Denial of Services on the Basis of National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970)).
38. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
39. See supra text accompanying note 35. See alsoJonathan D. Haft, Assuring Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity for Language-Minority Students: Bilingual Education and the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Act of 1974, 18 CoLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 209, 217-18 (1983) (discussing
the Lau court's reliance on the OCR Title VI guidelines in its decision).
40. Lau, 414 U.S. at 568.
41. See id. (referring to Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Guidelines, 35
Fed. Reg. 11, 595 (1970)).
42. Id. at 566.
43. See Moran, supra note 11, at 267.
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yers, and Latino activists,44 the Lau Guidelines unequivocally pro-
moted bilingual education for LEP students from 1975 to 1977.
4 5
Specifically, the Lau Guidelines required schools to use either a transi-
tional bilingual education program, "a bilingual-bicultural education
program, or a multilingual-multicultural program at the elementary
and intermediate school levels."'46 In each of these programs the
teaching methodology focused upon using the child's native language
and heritage to foster academic learning.47 Under the Lau Guidelines,
it was only at the high school level that teachers were allowed to incor-
porate an intensive English program into the students' curricula.
48
However, in 1977, the American Institute for Research ("AIR") issued
a report, revealing that bilingual programs had no significant effect
on LEP students' performance on achievement tests. 49 As a result of
the AIR findings and subsequent irreconcilable arguments among ed-
ucators, researchers, bilingual education advocates, and English-only
proponents about the proper teaching methodology for LEP students,
the OCR withdrew the Lau Guidelines. 50
Consequently, while it appears from the Lau Guidelines that Con-
gress (through the OCR) may have initially interpreted Lau as pro-
moting bilingual education, by permitting the OCR to withdraw the
Guidelines, Congress reserved the power to make appropriate peda-
gogical choices in the local school districts.51 Therefore, the OCR's
original statement that local school districts "must take affirmative
steps to rectify the language deficiency," 52 returned as the controlling
directive from the federal government, without the promotion of any
particular type of teaching methodology. Therefore, the only remain-
ing Title VI regulation for LEP students today is, once again, the
OCR's original guidelines. 53
44. See id
45. See id. at 267-68.
46. Id
47. See id. at 268.
48. See id.
49. See generally id. at 268 ("[T] he benefits of native-language instruction in promoting
academic achievement were equivocal at best").
50. See id. at 270.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 265 (internal quotations omitted).
53. See id. at 270.
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3. The Equal Educational Opportunity Act and Castaneda v.
Pickard54
Although Congress ultimately repealed the Lau Guidelines, it re-
sponded to the Lau Court's decision by enacting the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Act 55 ("EEOA"). The EEOA states that "[n] o State
shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account
of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by ... failure by an
educational agency to take appropriate action to overcome language
barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instruc-
tional programs."56 Passed as a floor amendment, the EEOA has no
legislative history.5 7 Hence, courts had little guidance in applying the
EEOA until the Fifth Circuit decided Castaneda v. Pickard. In Cas-
taneda, Chicano parents alleged that a Texas school district was in vio-
lation of the EEOA because it failed "to implement adequate bilingual
education to overcome [their children's] linguistic barriers ... ."58 In
order to assess the school district's compliance, the Fifth Circuit de-
vised a three-prong test that federal courts continue to use today.59 In
addition to providing a mechanism by which courts could assess
school districts' compliance with the EEOA, the Castaneda court also
made an important point in dictum:
Congress... did not specify that a state must provide a program of
"bilingual education" to all limited English speaking students. We
think Congress' use of the less specific term, "appropriate action,"
rather than "biligual [sic] education," indicates that Congress in-
tended to leave state and local educational authorities a substantial
amount of latitude in choosing the programs and techniques they would use
to meet their obligations under the EEOA.6 0
Thus, school districts are free to determine what type of "appropriate
action" they deem necessary to teach LEP students. 6 1
C. California Law
Until 1995, California had a strong policy of promoting bilingual
education.62 In 1976, its legislature passed the Chacon-Moscone Bilin-
54. 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1981).
55. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-58 (1976).
56. Id. § 1703.
57. See Haft, supra note 39, at 233.
58. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 992.
59. See infta Part II.A and text accompanying note 88.
60. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009 (emphasis added).
61. See id.
62. See Stuart Biegel, The Parameters of the Bilingual Education Debate in California Twenty
Years After Lau v. Nichols, 14 CHiCANO-LATINO L. REv. 48, 53 (1994).
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gual-Bicultural Education Act 63 ("Chacon-Moscone Act"), which, in its
amended 1980 form, required that "[e]ach pupil of limited English
proficiency enrolled in the California public school system in kinder-
garten through grade 12 ... receive instruction in a language under-
standable to the pupil which recognizes the pupil's primary language
and teaches the pupil English."64 In essence, the Chacon-Moscone Act
mandated bilingual education for LEP students. Although the
Chacon-Moscone Act expired in 1987,65 and California ostensibly no
longer required bilingual education for LEP students, 66 the California
Legislature continued to fund the program under the Sunset Statutes
of the California Education Code.67 Pursuant to a program advisory
distributed by Superintendent of Public Instruction Bill Honig, it be-
came apparent that if schools wanted to receive bilingual education
funding under the Sunset Statutes, they had to "continue providing
services that were consistent with the general purposes of the old bi-
lingual-bicultural requirements" of the Chacon-Moscone Act.68
In 1995, the California State Board of Education ("Board") de-
cided local school districts needed more flexibility in designing pro-
grams for LEP students.69 In its policy statement, the Board issued five
"Principles for Educational Programs and Services for English Learn-
ers" 70 ("Principles"). Clearly aimed at providing local school districts
wide discretion in their LEP teaching methodologies, the Principles
explicitly stated that "local programs may include primary language
instruction, English language development through sheltered content
63. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 52160-78 (West 1987).
64. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52165.
65. See Biegel, supra note 62, at 54 (noting that then Govenor George Deukmejian
vetoed legislation enacted to continue the Chacon-Moscone Act, thereby permitting the
Act to expire).
66. See id.
67. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 62002 (West Supp. 1999). The statute states in pertinent
part:
If the Legislature does not enact legislation to continue a program listed in [this
part] .... the funding of that program shall continue for the general purposes of
that program as specified in the provisions relating to the establishment and op-
eration of the program.... The funds shall be used for the intended purposes of
the program ....
Id. Further, these statutes allowed for the continued funding of programs that were no
longer mandatory, such as bilingual education, which was no longer required after the
demise of the Chacon-Mascone Act. See Biegel, supra note 62, at 55.
68. Biegel, supra note 62, at 55; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 62002.
69. See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Battle over Bilingual Education in California, 123 EDuc.
L. REP. 459, 468 (1998).
70. Id at 468 n.40.
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instruction, and/or other sound instructional methodologies. '71 How-
ever, with the passage of Proposition 227, primary language instruc-
tion (i.e., bilingual education) is no longer an option. 72
D. Proposition 227
Passing with sixty-one percent of the vote, Proposition 227 re-
quired for the first time in two decades that California LEP schoolchil-
dren to begin their 1998-99 school year without the option of
bilingual teaching.73 The key provisions of the initiative are as follows:
[A]l1 children in California public schools shall be taught English
by being taught in English. In particular, this shall require that all
children be placed in English language classrooms. Children who
are English learners shall be educated through sheltered English
immersion during a temporary transition period not normally in-
tended to exceed one year. Local schools shall be permitted to
place in the same classroom English learners of different ages but
whose degree of English proficiency is similar .... Once English
learners have acquired a good working knowledge of English, they
shall be transferred to English language mainstream classrooms.74
Finally, with "prior written informed" parental consent, the re-
quirements of Proposition 227 may be waived annually if: (a) the child
"already knows English," (b) the child is older than ten years of age,
and the school believes an "alternate course of educational study
would be better suited to the child's rapid acquisition of basic English
language skills;" or (c) the child has been in an English immersion
class for at least thirty days and the school determines that "an alter-
nate course of educational study would be better suited to the child's
overall educational development." 75 In short, a section 305 waiver may
be granted annually with prior written informed consent from either
the child's parents or legal guardian.
II. The Case-Valeria G. v. Wilson 76
The day after Proposition 227 passed, public interest groups that
opposed the initiative filed a lawsuit in federal district court request-
ing a preliminary injunction, challenging the initiative under federal
71. Id
72. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (West Supp. 1999); see also Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 1007, 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that Proposition 227 does not violate
either the United States Constitution or applicable federal law).
73. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
74. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305.
75. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 310-11.
76. 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007.
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statutes and the United States Constitution. 77 In Valeria G. v. Wilson,
plaintiffs argued Proposition 227 violated the EEOA, the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, Tide VI of the Civil Rights
Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion.78 The court began its legal analysis by making three "prelimi-
nary observations." First, the court noted that "the proponents and
the opponents of Proposition 227 all share the same objective: to edu-
cate children who have limited English proficiency. ' 79 Second, the
court stated it could not "discern from the face of Proposition 227 any
hidden agenda of racial or national origin discrimination against any
group."80 Third, the court noted that "each side ha[d] submitted ex-
tensive evidence and arguments, including research studies and some-
times vehement expert opinions, that their education system is the
better one."81 However, with respect to each legal argument the plain-
tiffs asserted, the district court determined the plaintiffs were unable
to sustain their burden, and denied their motion for a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the defendants from implementing Proposition
227, pending resolution of the trial on the merits.8 2
A. The Equal Education Opportunity Act Requires Only
"Appropriate Action"
As to the EEOA claim, the court first emphasized that the statute
merely requires "appropriate action to overcome language barriers"8 3
and that "[t] he EEOA does not define what is 'appropriate action.' 84
Citing Castaneda v. Pickard as "[t] he leading circuit court decision on
[the EEOA]," 85 the Valeria G. court applied Castaneda's three-part test
in order to determine "whether a particular educational program...
constitute[s] 'appropriate action' under Section 1703(f)" of the
EEOA. 86 The Castaneda test requires courts to determine:
[First,] the soundness of the educational theory or principles upon
which the challenged program is based[; second,] whether the pro-
grams and practices actually used by a school system are reasonably
77. See id. at 1012.
78. See id. at 1015.
79. Id. at 1014. Additionally, the court stated that "not all LEP students were born
outside of the United States." Id. at 1014 n.5.
80. Id. at 1014.
81. Id. at 1015.
82. See id. at 1027-28.
83. Id. at 1016 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1701(f)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1017.
86. Id.
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calculated to implement effectively the educational theory adopted
by the school[; and finally, i]f a school's program, although pre-
mised on a legitimate educational theory ... fails ... to produce
results indicating that the language barriers confronting students
are actually being overcome.
87
The court determined Proposition 227 satisfied the first prong of Cas-
taneda because the defendants had presented persuasive evidence that
the English immersion programs were based on sound educational
theory.8 8 As to the second and third prongs, the court noted that since
no programs had yet been implemented under Proposition 227, it
would be premature to evaluate the initiative's effectiveness. 89
B. No Violation of the Supremacy Clause
Turning to the Supremacy Clause claim, the Valeria G. court
stated that "[u]nder the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 'any
state law... which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must
yield."' 9 0 Claiming the Bilingual Education Act was proof of a "'con-
gressionally-favored option' of primary language instruction," 9 1 plain-
tiffs asserted that Proposition 227 barred them from exercising this
favored option, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause.9 2 The court,
however, found that while Congress may have promoted bilingual edu-
cation through the Bilingual Education Act, "it did not require bilin-
gual education."9 3 The court further indicated that by also enacting
the EEOA, which only required "appropriate action," Congress did not
intend for bilingual education to be the only method by which non-
English-speaking students could be taught English.9 4 Therefore, the
87. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
89. See id. at 1021.
90. Id. (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).
91. Id. at 1022.
92. See id.
93. Id. Further, the court noted:
Plaintiffs are correct that the statements of "Findings," "Policy," and "Purpose" of
Bilingual Education Act suggest that Congress encouraged bilingual education
programs. Congress did so by offering financial assistance. But it did not require
bilingual education. And the fact that Congress was aware of bilingual education
suggests that Congress made a deliberate choice not to mandate such programs
when it simultaneously enacted the EEOA, which requires only "appropriate ac-
tion." Congress did not prohibit or otherwise discourage other educational pro-
grams for LEP students.
Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).
94. See id. at 1022.
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court found that the Supremacy Clause was not violated because no
federal law specifically mandated bilingual education.95
C. Insufficient Evidence to Assess a Facial Challenge to Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Plaintiffs' next argument was that the initiative violated Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 The plaintiffs contended that by forcing
students into an English-immersion program and by prematurely plac-
ing them in regular classrooms, they were being denied "meaningful
access to academic curriculum." 97 The court stated that in order for
plaintiffs to succeed on this argument, they had to at least prove "dis-
criminatory effect."98 However, the court dismissed this argument be-
cause plaintiffs failed to prove an "adverse impact [would be]
inevitable" given that the initiative had "not yet had any impact on
anyone."99 Rather, the court found that many of the arguments the
plaintiffs advanced to support a showing of adverse impact were based
either on assumptions about how Proposition 227 would operate or
on the belief that the teaching methodology in English-immersion
programs was ineffective. 100 As to plaintiffs' assumptions that Proposi-
tion 227 would prevent students from "fully participat[ing] in main-
stream classes," the court reasoned that on the face of Proposition
227, it could not reach a similar conclusion because the initiative had
not yet been implemented.1 01 As such, the court found the plaintiffs'
lack of faith in English immersion programs unconvincing. 10 2 Noting
that both experts and the California electorate believed the require-
ments of the "initiative [would] have a beneficial rather than a detri-
mental effect on LEP students," the court concluded that on its face,
Proposition 227 would not "result in an adverse effect, exclusion, de-
nial of benefits, or discrimination."1 03
95. See iat at 1021-22. The court articulated that it saw "no conflict between Proposi-
tion 227 and the ability of school districts to comply with either the EEOA or the policies
expressed in the Bilingual Education Act." Id. at 1022.
96. See id. at 1022.
97. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
98. See id. at 1022-23. The Valeria G. court noted that while courts are divided as to
whether a showing of an adverse disparate impact or the higher standard of discriminatory
intent is required for a Title VI violation, the Ninth Circuit seemed to have concluded that
a mere showing of discriminatory impact would be sufficient. See id.
99. Id. at 1023.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Id.
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D. Plaintiffs' Unconventional Argument Alleging Equal Protection
Violation Is Unpersuasive
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed Proposition 227 violated the Equal
Protection Clause, which guarantees that "'no state shall.., deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 104
Interestingly, the plaintiffs did not make a conventional Equal Protec-
tion claim by alleging that Proposition 227 itself violated the United
States Constitution. 10 5 Rather, they argued that Proposition 227 vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause by denying them equal access to the
political structure. 10 6 That is, by imposing the difficult hurdle of
amending the initiative only through approval of the electorate or a
statute passed by a two-thirds vote of the legislature and signed by the
governor, this barrier to changing the law "elevate[d] the decision-
making process to a higher level of government than would otherwise
be required" and therefore "disadvantaged [the plaintiffs] in attempt-
ing to modify" Proposition 227.107
The court first stated that simply because a law "'resolves an issue
at a higher level of state government says nothing in and of itself.' 108
It further reasoned that an impediment to bilingual education was a
constitutional right embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. 0 9
Questioning whether the plaintiffs' equal protection rights could be
violated when there is no constitutional right to bilingual education,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' unconventional Equal Protection
claim.11 0
Ill. Analysis
A. The Initiative Power
To assess the Valeria G. decision, one must understand its analyti-
cal perspective. At the beginning of its discussion, the Valeria G. court
accurately expressed that "[i] t is not the province of this court to im-
pose on the people of California its view of which is the better educa-
tion policy,"111 recognizing that "[t]he voters of California expressed
104. Id. at 1023-25 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
105. See id. at 1023-24.
106. See id. at 1024.
107. Id. at 1023-24.
108. Id. at 1024 (quoting Coalition For Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 706
(9th Cir. 1997)).
109. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1025.
110. See id.
111. Id at 1015.
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their policy preference by enacting Proposition 227."112 California has
a long history of its voters exercising direct legislative power through
voter initiatives. 113 Indeed, its first state constitution provides for refer-
endum. 11 4 Aware of California's. tradition of honoring its citizens' role
in shaping statutory law, the United States Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged, "California's entire history demonstrates the repeated
use of referendums to give citizens a voice on questions of public pol-
icy .... [R] eferendums have been a commonplace occurrence in the
State's active political life. Provisions for referendums demonstrate
the devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination or
prejudice."11 5
The power of the referendum in California is even greater than
that described by the United States Supreme Court. In Associated Home
Builders v. Livermore,116 the California Supreme Court stated that the
1911 amendment to the California Constitution (providing for the ini-
tiative and referendum) 17 was not merely a right that the government
granted to the people,1 18 as the United States Supreme Court seems
to imply, rather, "the amendment speaks of the initiative and referen-
dum... as a power reserved by them."'19 Given the California Supreme
Court's interpretation that the initiative power originates with the
people, California courts have given great deference to the initiative
process.1 20 As stated in Legislature v. Eu:121
112. Id.
113. SeeJames v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
114. See id. "A referendum provision was included in the first state constitution, Cal.
Const. of 1849, Art. VIII." Id.
115. Id. at 141.
116. 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976).
117. See id. at 477 n.7. The Court stated:
The initiative and referendum amendment, formerly article IV, section 1, of the
California Constitution, stated in part that "The initiative and referendum powers
of the people are hereby further reserved to the electors of each county, city and
county, city and town of the State to be exercised under such procedure as may
be provided by law .... This section is self-executing, but legislation may be en-
acted to facilitate its operation, but in no way limiting or restricting either the
provisions of this section or the powers herein reserved." This language was re-
pealed in 1966 and replaced by article IV, section 25, which provides that "Initia-
tive and referendum powers may be exercised by the electors of each city or
county under procedures that the Legislature shall provide."
Id.
118. See id. at 477.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. SeeJames D. Gordon III and David B. Magleby, Pre-ElectionJudicial Review of Initia-
tives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 298, 300-01 (1989).
121. 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991).
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Indeed, it is our solemn duty to jealously guard the precious initia-
tive power, and to resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of its ex-
ercise. As with statutes adopted by the Legislature, all
presumptions favor the validity of initiative measures and mere
doubts as to validity are insufficient; such measures must be upheld
unless their unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistaka-
bly appears. 12 2
Furthermore, the initiative power is available precisely for in-
stances in which the electorate is dissatisfied with its lawmakers. The
voters of California have every right to usurp decision-making power
from a governmental entity when they are displeased with its perform-
ance. 12 3 As stated in Raven v. Deukmejian:
"[T] he initiative is in essence a legislative battering ram which may
be used to tear through the exasperating tangle of the traditional
legislative procedure and strike directly toward the desired end."
Although lawmaking by the Legislature and lawmaking by the peo-
ple are different in process, they are, of course, identical in sub-
stance and effect.
124
Because the courts presume that laws passed by the Legislature are
valid and constitutional, the courts should therefore also extend this
same deference to laws passed by the voters. 125 In fact, "[w]hen the
electorate assumes to exercise the law-making function, then [it] is as
much a state agency as any of its elected officials."' 26 By relying on the
Eu court's analytical approach to determine the substantive validity of
Proposition 227, the Valeria G. court explicitly recognized that a deci-
sion invalidating Proposition 227-based on violations of the EEOA,
the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act or the
Supremacy Clause-must overcome the difficult barrier of presump-
tive validity.12 7
122. Id, at 1313 (citations omitted).
123. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1089 (Cal. 1990) (upholding Proposition
115 except for "the provision purporting to revise the 'independent rights' principle of
article I, section 24" of the California Constitution).
124. Id. at 1091 (quoting KEy & CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN CALI-
FORNIA p. 458 (1939)).
125. See Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal. 1991).
126. Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 834 (Cal. 1966), afrd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
127. See Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1014-15 (N.D. Cal. 1998). "The
voters of California expressed their policy preference by enacting Proposition 227. The
only decision this court can properly make is whether Proposition 227 violates any federal
statute or the United States Constitution." Id. at 1015.
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B. The Equal Educational Opportunity Act
1. Bilingual Education Programs and the Second Prong of
Castaneda
Using the Castaneda test to determine whether Proposition 227
violates the EEOA, the Valeria G. court stated, "Proposition 227 will
satisfy the first prong of the Castaneda test, '128 but the "court may not
go beyond that conclusion and determine whether it is the better the-
ory.' 1 29 If, however, an inquiry were to reveal that bilingual education
programs are being improperly implemented in the California public
school system, then by default a court would have to at least conclude
that they are not "the better theory."
While at the time of the Valeria G. decision it was not possible to
assess whether the implementation of Proposition 227 would meet the
goals of its teaching method, it was possible to assess the success of
twenty years of bilingual education. Further, although the court as-
serted to the contrary, the question of which method is the better edu-
cation theory is certainly within the court's "province.' 30 Specifically,
if bilingual teaching methods are not being "reasonably calculated to
implement effectively"13l the bilingual education programs, as re-
quired under the second prong of Castaneda,13 2 then the teaching
methods would fail both the Castaneda test and the goal of Section
1703(f) of the EEOA, which is "to overcome language barriers that
impede equal participation ... in its instructional programs.' 1 33 Con-
sequently, a court would be obligated to determine that bilingual edu-
cation is in fact not the better theory.
2. Achieving Fluency in English Is the Objective of Educational
Programs for LEP Students
A preliminary question essential to the assessment of the lan-
guage programs for LEP students is whether the programs' primary
goal is to prepare these students for the English-speaking classroom
environment. As discussed in Part I, this appears to be the current
goal of California programs for LEP students, a goal that is not in
conflict with Congress's present stance toward the education of LEP
128. Id at 1019 (requiring a program of sound educational theory).
129. Id
130. See id. at 1015.
131. Id. at 1020.
132. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1010 (5th Cir. 1981).
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1997).
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students. 13 4 The following analysis presumes the goal of the programs
is to help LEP students become proficient and eventually fluent in
English so that they can fully realize their academic potential along-
side native English-speaking students in mainstream classrooms.
a. The Major Problem of Properly Implementing Bilingual
Education Programs-Misidentification
An issue not addressed by the Valeria G. court, but critical to an
analysis of whether language programs are being properly imple-
mented (and thereby satisfying the second prong of Castaneda), is the
proper identification of students as "Limited English Proficient." In-
deed, at the insistence of various bilingual proponents, the federal
courts have been heavily involved with school districts in identifying
which students should be placed in bilingual programs, 35 forcing the
courts to act as a "Supreme Board of Education"-precisely what the
Valeria G. court refused to do. 136
Aspira v. Board of Education137 is one of the earliest federal cases
which set specific standards for a school district to follow in identify-
ing LEP students.138 Plaintiffs argued for placing children in bilingual
educational programs if their test scores were higher in Spanish than
in English.1 39 Finding the research supporting classification by this
method speculative, the court rejected plaintiffs' request.140 The court
did decide, however, to set the English test score for identification as
an LEP student at a twentieth percentile cut-off point.14' Under pres-
sure to make a quick decision, 142 the court acknowledged that using
134. See Wenkart, supra note 69, at 468; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (West Supp.
1999); Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1012. For a complete discussion of Congress's current
attitude toward language programs for LEP students, see supra Part I.B.
135. See generally Aspira of New York v. Board of Educ. of N.Y., 394 F. Supp. 1161,
1163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that students whose score on an English proficiency test
fell below the twentieth percentile have to be included in the bilingual program); Cintron
v. Brentwood Union Free School Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Jimenez v.
Honig, 233 Cal. Rptr. 817, 822 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that any plan to restructure a
bilingual program must contain specific methods for identifying children deficient in Eng-
lish and monitoring their progress).
136. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1015.
137. 394 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
138. See id. at 1166.
139. See id. at 1165.
140. See id. at 1164.
141. See id at 1165. In other words, students who scored below the twentieth percentile
were classified as LEP students.
142. The Aspira court was responding to a court decree requiring a course of testing to
identify "those 'whose English language difficulties prevent them from effectively partici-
pating in the learning process'" and who could better learn in Spanish. Aspira of New York
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test scores as an identification method could result in over-inclusion,
but that it was "merely a court, consigned to the drawing of lines, and
[it does] the best [it] can." 143 Interestingly, under Aspira, if a student
scored below the twentieth percentile on his or her Spanish and Eng-
lish test score-implying that the student may have learning problems
not necessarily related to a lack of fluency in English-the school
would still place the student in a bilingual education program in
which the instruction would be primarily in Spanish. 144
Similarly, later federal court decisions set arbitrary and even
more specific guidelines based on very little research. 145 Following in
Aspira's footsteps eight years later, the court in Keyes v. School District
No. 1146 again avoided any comparison between Spanish and English
test scores in determining placement in bilingual education.1 47 Even
more expansive in its classification of LEP students than Aspira, the
Keyes court noted that the programs allowed a student to take an Eng-
lish language proficiency test if a questionnaire identified him or her
as limited-English speaking.1 48 However, the court left undetermined
the role of the students' test scores in identifying LEP students. Again,
if they were comparable to the English test scores, then it could be
possible the student had a learning problem unrelated to the issue of
English proficiency. In other words, the court left undetermined
whether English was the predominant language in the child's home
or whether those not speaking English were bilingual. 149 Instead,
upon this identification in the home survey and with an "English as a
Second Language" test score classifying the student as LEP, the school
district placed the student in bilingual education.150
In Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free School District,5 1 a group of La-
tino children brought suit against the Brentwood School District
claiming the district's plan to replace its current bilingual program
with a new one entitled, "Plan V," violated the EEOA.152 Concluding
that the defendant's special language programs had no means of iden-
v. Board of Educ. of N.Y., 394 F. Supp. 1161, 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The testing was to begin
May 30. The case came to the court approximately one week before May 30th. See id.
143. Id, at 1166.
144. See Rossell & Baker, supra note 11, at 594.
145. See generally Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1983).
146. 576 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Colo. 1983).
147. See id. at 1513.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1514.
150. See id. at 1514-15.
151. 455 F. Supp. 57 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
152. See id at 58-59.
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tifying "language deficient children in the upper grades,"153 the court
ordered the school to identify those children through "recognized
and validated tests," which would track and assess their achievement
to determine when the students were ready for the mainstream Eng-
lish-speaking classroom.154 Unfortunately, the court did not address
the availability of such tests.' 55 According to numerous researchers,
tests which accurately measure a student's need for special language
instruction do not presently exist.156
Finally, in fimenez v. Honig,157 the third appellate district recog-
nized "that rigid numerical cut-off scores were unreliable as the sole
indicator of a student's language performance skills"' 58 and that more
flexibility was needed in order to properly reclassify an LEP student by
considering "all significant factors bearing on performance."1 59 Con-
sequently, the court upheld an amendment to the California Code of
Regulations, allowing a "language appraisal team"'160 to "reclassify a
pupil" notwithstanding test results.161 However, in no way did the lan-
guage appraisal team supersede the use of test scores. 162 Regardless of
the amendment, cut-off scores still played a major role in categorizing
a student as LEP. 163
b. California School Districts Continue to Use Poorly Designed
Identification Procedures That Misidentify Students as
LEP
In response to the Aspira, Keyes, Cintron, and Jimenez courts, Cali-
fornia school districts conducted surveys and tests to identify LEP stu-
153. I& at 63.
154. See id. at 64.
155. See id.
156. See generally Rossell & Baker, supra note 11, at 592-602 (discussing problems in
identifying classification criteria in both federal and state law); see also Declaration of Keith
Baker in Support of Motion for Leave to Intervene and in Opposition to Motion for Pre-
liminary Injunction, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (No. C98-
2252 CAL) [hereinafter Declaration of Keith Baker].
157. 233 Cal. Rptr. 817 (Ct. App. 1987).
158. Id, at 822.
159. Id.
160. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 4306(a) (1999).
161. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5, § 4306(b) (1999) (formerly CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 5,
§ 4306(b) (5) (1987)).
162. Seefimenez, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
163. See id.
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dents.164 While recognizing that individual teachers' judgment was a
major component of assessment, it appears California school districts
still rely heavily on the educational research community to devise tests
for identification. 165 The problem, however, is that research shows
California's identification procedures have serious flaws, resulting in
the misidentification of English-speaking students as LEP students. 166
In fact, LEP students may be overestimated by a factor of two or
three.1 67 Instead of the commonly accepted estimate of 1.4 million
LEP students, 168 one study found that "the true number of [LEP's] in
California may be less than 570,000 and no more than 700,000. '169 In
other words, a significant number of California children whose pri-
mary language is English are being taught academic subjects in
Spanish.
According to Kenneth Baker, a social science analyst and former
Educational Researcher for the U.S. Department of Education, 70 mis-
identification has many serious and obvious negative effects.171 First,
"it wastes scarce resources."'1 72 If schools are spending funds on chil-
164. See generally Rossell & Baker, supra note 11, at 589; see also Declaration of Keith
Baker, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, at tbl. 1 (the table reflects test data on
Canadian programs).
165. See Declaration of Keith Baker, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, at 10
n.12 (citing examples of misidentifying students as LEP).
A few examples of the consequences of using these psychometrically unsound
procedures: "Language Assessment Instruments... The collective experience of
these test users was quite discouraging ... they expressed little confidence in the
tests. Generally users felt that teacher judgement [sic] was more likely to be a
valid measure ... than any test that they had been using. However, project staff
continued to use the tests in the entry/exit process in order to satisfy state or
federal regulations or to give the appearance of objectivity... [.]"
Id. (citing Development of Entry/Exit Criteria (citations omitted)).
166. See id. ("'Two-thirds of the children in the sample are reported to be English
monolingual; half of them tested as LEP'" (quoting Language Among the Cherokee, Na-
tional Center for Bilingual Education)); see also id. at 10 n. 13.
Dulay and Burt (1980) tested 994 LEP students in California in both Spanish and
English. Only 362 (36 percent) had greater proficiency in Spanish than in Eng-
lish, and 335 (34 percent) spoke English better than they spoke Span-
ish .... Young et al. (1984) tested students who had been identified as LEP by
their schools. Nearly half (48 percent) [of] these LEP students were not profi-
cient in their supposed native language.
Id.
167. See id. at 23.
168. See Nanette Asimov, Educators Working Around Prop. 227; Districts Plan Bilingual Pro-
grams that Don't Violate Law, S.F. CHRON., July 31, 1998, at Al.
169. Declaration of Keith Baker, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, at 23.
170. See id. at Exhibit A.
171. See Rossell & Baker, supra note 11, at 621.
172. Id.
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dren who do not need special language instruction, then there is less
money available to those children who do need it.173 Second, children
are being misclassified as LEP students as a result of performing
poorly in school for reasons other than limited English proficiency. 174
Therefore, they are not receiving the type of help they actually
need. 75 Baker articulates that:
[P]roviding transitional bilingual education to students who do not
need it is worse than ineffective, it is harmful to these students. To
teach a low-achieving English-speaking student math in Spanish,
for example, not only denies him a meaningful math lesson, it also
denies him the opportunity to learn other subjects. Classroom time
is fixed in the normal school day and the addition of a math lesson
in Spanish to the curriculum means that some other subject has to
be dropped. 176
Thus, many English-proficient schoolchildren are being misidentified
as LEPs. Until California improves its identification procedures, the
better program for most LEPs is the structured English-immersion
program simply because, for many of the misclassified students, Eng-
lish is in fact their language. 177
3. State and Local Educational Agencies' Responsibilities Under
the EEOA and Proposition 227
The Valeria G. court concluded that "[i]n light of the evidence
submitted, . . . the English immersion system is a valid educational
theory.1 78 However, in assessing whether Proposition 227's require-
ment of English immersion complies with the EEOA, there is an issue
the court discussed only superficially that merits further analysis: Does
Proposition 227 prevent state educational agencies from fulfilling
their duty to assure compliance with the EEOA?179
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Md
177. See Declaration of Keith Baker, Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, at 23.
178. Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
179. See id. at 1016. The court only mentioned that the EEOA "imposes on states and
educational agencies an obligation 'to take appropriate action to overcome language barri-
ers that impede equal participation.'" Id. (quoting Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Educ.,
811 F.2d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 1987)). The court then proceeded to focus on the EEOA's
lack of definition of appropriate criteria, rather than considering the role of state and
educational agencies under Proposition 227. See id.
Fall 1999] VALERIA G. V. WILSON
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
a. The Duties of Local and State Agencies Under the EEOA
As noted in Part III.A, the power to legislate stems from the phi-
losophy that the ultimate power to govern rests with the people.
180
However, the question arises as to whether the people of California
have reserved the power to direct public education or whether they
have delegated this power to educational agencies. Section 1703(f) of
the EEOA provides in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall deny equal
educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her
race, color, sex, or national origin, by the failure of an educational
agency to take appropriate action to overcome language barriers that
impede equal participation by its students in its instructional pro-
grams." 8 1 In Idaho Migrant Council v. Board of Education,1 82 the Ninth
Circuit determined section 1703(f) requires a state agency "to ensure
that needs of students with limited English language proficiency are
addressed."' 83 Similarly, the Castaneda court emphasized that state
and local agencies are obligated to implement special language pro-
grams that comply with the goals of the EEOA.184 Other courts have
followed suit. In Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified School District,185 the court
stated:
This Court agrees with, and will heed, the warnings stated by the
Castaneda Court itself that courts should not substitute their educa-
tional values and theories for the educational and political deci-
sions properly reserved to local school authorities and the expert
knowledge of educators, since they are ill-equipped to do so.'
86
Similarly, the court in Gomez v. Illinois State Board of Education187 was
reluctant to impose its dogma on educators, acknowledging that peda-
gogical decisions must be "reserved to the state and local agencies."'
88
In short, a significant amount of case law indicates that state and local
agencies are responsible for overseeing school districts' compliance
with the EEOA.
180. See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1976).
181. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (1997) (emphasis added).
182. 647 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1981).
183. Id. at 71.
184. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981).
185. 724 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
186. Id. at 713.
187. 811 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1987).
188. 1I at 1041.
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b. Proposition 227 Does Not Impinge upon the Duties of Local
and State Agencies
By reserving substantial decision-making power with state and lo-
cal authorities, Proposition 227 does not prevent them from meeting
their responsibilities under the EEOA. In Section 311 (c), the initiative
clearly states that if an "alternate course of educational study" is re-
quired, the decision will be made "subject to . . .the local Board of
Education and ultimately the State Board of Education." 18 9 In addi-
tion, as stated in Valeria G., both state and local educational agencies
have significant latitude and discretion in deciding how to define
"good working knowledge of English," when to grant waivers, and
even how long a student will remain in the English immersion
program.190
In summary, Proposition 227 allows the State Board and local ed-
ucational agencies substantial latitude in implementing guidelines to
help LEP students become proficient in English as soon as practica-
ble. 191 Furthermore, it is within the province of California voters'
power to assert their right to direct educational policy under the
EEOA and supersede the power of the Legislature.' 92
C. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
A key element to plaintiffs' claim in Valeria G. is that Proposition
227 "imposes an unjustifiable disparate impact on national origin mi-
norities, by denying LEP students meaningful access to academic cur-
riculum during its sheltered English immersion program," thereby
violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.193 In claiming they had been
denied "meaningful access to academic curriculum," the plaintiffs
were particularly concerned that LEP students would be placed "pre-
maturely into mainstream academic classrooms, without providing
any remedial instruction to recoup the academic deficits incurred by
them during that program." 94 Under the Proposition 227 paradigm,
not only are LEP students taught English in a separate English immer-
sion program, but their core curriculum is also taught in English. 195
This mode of instruction is a sharp contrast to bilingual education in
189. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 311 (b),(c) (West Supp. 1999).
190. Valeria G. v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
191. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 311(c).
192. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990).
193. Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1022 (internal quotations omitted).
194. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
195. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 305 (West Supp. 1999).
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which students are taught all their academic subjects in their native
language.1 96
The court dismissed the Title VI claim, stating it was impossible to
know beforehand whether Proposition 227 would have a discrimina-
tory impact prior to school districts implementing the English immer-
sion program. 197 Further, given the body of evidence showing the
beneficial effects of a structured English immersion program, plain-
tiffs could not "establish[ ] that an adverse impact is inevitable."1 98
However, with respect to Title VI, plaintiffs' facial challenge against
Proposition 227 raises a troubling question: how can LEP students
have meaningful access to the core curriculum comparable to that of
their English-proficient peers if they do not understand the language
in which they are being taught? Indeed, this echoes the central con-
cern of Lau, where the San Francisco Unified School District violated
Tide VI by failing to provide adequate English language instruction
for LEP students. 199
1. English Immersion Programs Do Not Violate Tide VI of the
Civil Rights Act
Nowhere in Lau or its progeny has any court required a school to
teach children English concurrently with the core curriculum. 200 In
fact, a sequential form of instruction, in which English acquisition is a
priority over learning academic subjects, has been upheld in Cas-
taneda.20 1 There, the court supported a program that focused on de-
veloping literacy in English "even if the result of such a program [was]
an interim sacrifice of learning in other areas during this period." 202
Furthermore, the California State Board of Education also embraces
this approach. 20 3
Additionally, to comply with Castaneda, the school is required to
assure students "attain parity of participation" with their English-
196. See Moran, supra note 11, at 256 n.4.
197. See Valeria G., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
198. Id.
199. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-568 (1974).
200. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 566 (1974).
201. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981).
202. Id
203. See Educational Programs and Services for English Learners, CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION POLICY 98-04 (adopted Oct. 8, 1998). The State Board's advisory states: "As
stated in Castaneda, English fluency and academic achievement do not need to be achieved
simultaneously but may be addressed sequentially as long as over a reasonable period of
time English learners [LEP students] do not suffer academically as measured under the
federal standards established in Castaneda v. Pickard." Id.
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speaking peers in academic subjects. 20 4 Proposition 227 also satisfies
this requirement, providing every opportunity for schools to design
programs that assure compliance with Castaneda's directive. 20 5 Again,
under the broad discretion given school districts and educators in sec-
tion 310 of the Education Code, schools are free to provide additional
services that they believe necessary to bring LEP students "up to
speed."20 6 There is strong precedent established for this approach. In
Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified School District, the court found no discrimi-
natory impact under Title VI where the Berkeley school district had
developed a program for LEP students that did not use native lan-
guage instruction and focused primarily on learning English with the
additional support of peer tutors and after-school tutorials.20 7 More
recently, in Quiroz v. State Board of Education,208 the court again found
no Title VI violation where the entire curriculum was predominantly
in English and supplemented with "an After School Tutorial Program,
a Summer/Intersession Program, a pre-kindergarten program, and a
'preview-review' program."20 9 Amply supported by the California State
Board and federal case law, a school district focusing primarily on
teaching English before bringing students "up to speed" with their
English-fluent peers on academic subjects does not violate Title VI.
2. Bilingual Education Violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
In contrast to the plaintiffs' claim in Valeria G., a strong argument
can be made that bilingual education programs do violate Title VI.
Related to this issue is the alarming statistic that in 1997, "only 6.7
percent of limited-English students in California learned enough Eng-
lish to be moved into mainstream classes." 210 This figure seems to im-
ply that many students may spend their entire elementary and
secondary school years in bilingual education programs, separated
from their English-proficient peers. Furthermore, after twenty years of
bilingual education, Latino immigrant children-the primary recipi-
ents of bilingual education-have the lowest test scores and highest
204. Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1011.
205. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 311(c) (West Supp. 1999).
206. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 315 (West Supp. 1999).
207. See Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 708-09, 712 (N.D.
Cal. 1989).
208. No. CIV.S. 97-1600-WBS/GGH, 1997 WL 661163, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1997).
209. Id. at *5.
210. Argument in Favor of Proposition 227, CAUFORNIA VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE PRI-
MARY ELECTION JUNE 2 1998 BALLOT PAMPHLET, 34.
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dropout rates of any immigrant group. 211 On these facts alone, there
is a strong suggestion that the implementation of bilingual education
in California has had a disproportionately adverse effect on Latino
schoolchildren and therefore violates Title VI.
Although Larry v. Riles212 considered the classification of mentally
retarded students, rather than the classification of LEP students, its
discussion provides additional support for the argument that bilingual
education programs violate Title VI. In Larry, IQ tests were used for
placing children in classes for the educable mentally retarded
("EMR").213 The tests resulted in a disproportionate placement of Af-
rican-Americans in EMR classes. 21 4 Affirming the trial court's deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant superintendent had
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, because the EMR classes had a
"definite adverse effect" on African-Americans in that the EMR classes
are "dead-end classes," which de-emphasize academic skills and stig-
matize children improperly placed in them. 215 Similarly, if over ninety
percent of LEP students are never mainstreamed into English-speak-
ing classes 216 and if Latinos, the largest recipients of bilingual educa-
tion, 217 have the lowest test scores of any immigrant group, 218 it seems
that bilingual education may also be a dead-end form of instruction,
stigmatizing California Latino school children. A dead-end bilingual-
education school program, primarily attended by minority students,
that keeps children academically behind their English-proficient
peers throughout their education and their professional lives, is also a
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
Conclusion
By passing Proposition 227 through its initiative power, the Cali-
fornia electorate loudly communicated its dismay regarding the nega-
tive impact twenty years of bilingual education has had on LEP
schoolchildren. As a consequence of misidentifying LEP students and
placing them indefinitely in separate bilingual education programs,
which mainstream only 6.7% of its students annually into English-
211. See id.
212. 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984).
213. See id at 973.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 983.
216. Argument in Favor of Proposition 227, CALIFORNIA VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE PRI-
MARY ELECTION JUNE 2 1998 BALLOT PAMPHLET, 34.
217. See id,
218. See id.
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speaking classrooms, bilingual education in California has proven to
be a failure in both theory and practice. By contrast, the English-only
immersion program mandated by Proposition 227 appears to offer a
more promising outcome and was properly upheld in Valeria G. v. Wil-
son. First, English-only immersion programs avoid the misidentifica-
tion problems inherent in trying to classify LEP students and are
therefore considerably more likely to meet the second prong of Cas-
taneda and comply with the EEOA. Second, Proposition 227 allows lo-
cal and state authorities to direct their school districts' special needs,
thereby complying with the EEOA. Finally, by requiring an intensive
English instruction program which aims to mainstream LEP students
as soon as practicable, Proposition 227 finally gives LEP students what
they have always deserved: the opportunity to become proficient in
English so that they will be in a better position to compete with native
English-speakers in the classroom and in the workforce.
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